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Perceptions of the existence and causes of structural violence in Ogoni communities, 
Nigeria 
 
     
Abstract: This article explores the perceptions of Ogoni people about the existence and 
causes of structural violence in their communities. It relies heavily on qualitative data 
collected from five oil- rich and three oil-poor Ogoni communities, between February and 
May 2014, during which 200 open-ended survey questionnaires were administered and 189 
were returned. Three focus group discussions and 69 key informant interviews were also 
conducted. The findings of the article are that structural violence can be found in Ogoniland; 
it is manifested in both visible and invisible forms; it is blamed by elites on exogenous 
factors, but by the disadvantaged on both exogenous and endogenous factors; and it will only 
be eliminated by reducing inequality and increasing democratisation.  
 
Keywords: Structural violence; endogenous; exogenous; visible and invisible forms of 
violence 
 
1. Introduction   
 
Since over five decades efforts at bringing peace and development to Ogoniland have not 
yielded the desired results, this study examines the perceptions of the Ogoni people in both 
oil rich and oil poor communities about the existence and causes of persistent structural 
violence in their communities in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. The study employs both secondary 
and primary data. The secondary data, which originate from documentary and literature 
sources, are used in Section 2 to explore the concept of structural violence and in Section 3 to 
explain the condition of Ogoni communities. The results of the primary data, which originate 
from extensive fieldwork in eight Ogoni communities, are presented in Section 4, and Section 
5 discusses these results. Section 6 concludes that structural violence does occur in both oil 
rich and oil poor communities in Ogoniland and for peace and development, ways must be 
found to eliminate it. 
  
 
2. The concept of structural violence 
 
Structural violence refers to the social machinery of oppression: “arrangements are structural 
because they are embedded in the political and economic organization…they are violent 
because they cause injury to people” (Farmers et al, 2006, p.1). It is a form of injustice built 
into social structures which harms their members and prevents them from meeting their needs 
(Galtung, 1969). For Kohler and Alcock (1976), structural violence is any social structure 
that cause death, pain, or harm to the people it is meant to protect. For Galtung, such a social 
structure causes both physical and emotional damage: “a violence structure leaves marks not 
only on the human body but also on the mind and the spirit” (Galtung, 1990, p. 294). For 
example, it physically kills its subjects during wars which arise from social oppression and 
reprisal, and it emotionally kills them in the form of deprivation of human needs and freedom 
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and infliction of misery (Galtung, 1990). While scholars may argue that “insults, deprivation 
of human needs and misery” are not really violence, Galtung (1990, p.293) explains that “to 
the victims…it may mean slow but intentional killing”. Structural violence may be insidious 
and clever, often subtly normalizing social injustice. It:  
 
“erases the history and consciousness of the social origins of poverty, sickness, 
hunger, and premature death, so that they are simply taken for granted and naturalised 
so that no one is held accountable except, perhaps, the poor themselves…Structural 
violence is violence that is permissible, even encouraged. Indeed most everyday 
violent acts are not seen as such, and are condoned, mis-recognised, and deemed as 
necessary to the maintenance of crucial cultural, social and political institutions” 
(Scheper-Hughes, 2004, p.14) 
 
The concept of structural violence demonstrates how structural arrangements restrain 
individual agency to the point of infringing human rights (Ho, 2007). There are many 
different causes and manifestations of structural violence.  For example gun violence in the 
United States is structural violence because it not only infringes the rights of individual 
members of minority groups, but it also causes trauma, pain and poverty for the family of gun 
victims (Tanya et al 2017). Unequal access to resources, power, health, and education are 
also common manifestations of structural violence (Farmer et al, 2006). A recent study of the 
Tonga minority ethnic group in Zimbabwe traced the source of their chronic poverty and 
disability to their social structures, which excludes the very poor from contributing to 
decisions that affect them. For example, Muderedzi (2017, p. 6) reports “that disabled 
children who were attending school in the district were illiterates because of lack of special 
needs schools and teachers. As a result, there was no child who managed to finish primary 
school education”, hence the Tongas maintained a cycle of poverty. Shaw (2012, p.168) 
argues that almost every community in Africa suffers from structural violence because so 
many people “are still wallowing in life-threatening poverty, facing low life expectancy, 
social exclusion, ill health, illiteracy, dependency and effective enslavement”. In other words, 
it is claimed that these communities experience severe ‘needs-deficit’, a trauma caused by 
structural violence, a “feeling of hopelessness, deprivation/frustration syndrome that shows 
up on the inside as self-directed aggression and on the outside as apathy and withdrawal” 
(Galtung, 1990, p.5).  
 
There is a distinction to be drawn between visible and invisible manifestations of structural 
violence: visible manifestations are obvious and include acute poverty; whereas invisible 
manifestations are more implicit and include insidious discrimination. There is also a 
distinction to be drawn between exogenous and endogenous causes of structural violence: 
exogenous causes come from outside the community, whereas endogenous causes come from 
inside the community. Applying this latter distinction to Africa, we find that many writers 
hold that the root causes of structural violence in African communities are largely imported 
and therefore exogenous. Calderisi (2006) notes that although occasionally some Africans 
blame their own cultures, they have not stopped mentioning the ‘West’ as the primary cause 
of their problems. For example, Asafa (2015) listed colonial capitalism, terrorism and racism 
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as the triple causes of structural violence in African communities. Casey-Hayford, cited in 
Rodney (1973, p.51), claimed that before the arrival of Europeans, African communities were 
not structurally violent but peaceful: “before even the British came into relations with our 
people, we were a developed people, having our own institutions, having our own ideas of 
government”. For instance, before the 1914 British amalgamation of the northern and 
southern protectorate which gave birth to Nigeria, the Hausa societies maintained centralised 
local systems of government and were peaceful despite the invasion of the Fulanis (Sampson, 
2014). Likewise the Yoruba and the Igbos had their own settled self-governing structures  
(Sampson, 2014;  Rodney, 1973).  
 
For such writers,  the enduring virtues of these traditional institutions include claims that they 
exemplified quality leadership because they were custodians of indigenous knowledge 
(Dinbaba, 2014;  Kendie and Guri nd); they were communal in that their members shared a 
strong sense of community (Kangalawe et al, 2014); they preached the principles of equality 
and participation (Dawari and Omotola 2010); and they brought stability because they 
remained when exogenous organizations faded away (Kendie and Guri, nd, Kangalawe et al, 
2014). On this view, traditional African communities were harmonious organisms:  
 
“In traditional African society the sacred and the secular are inseparable. 
There is no compartmentalization of life. All the various aspects of humans’ 
life are interwoven. What religion forbids or condemns, the society also 
forbids and condemns, and similarly society approves those things which 
religion approves or and sanctions” (Nwafor, 2013, p.127). 
 
But, the argument runs, Europeans turned these peaceful self-governing structures into 
violent structures through the slave trade, colonialism and neo-colonialism, restructuring 
Africa for their own economic gain (Rodney, 1973; Shaw, 2012). For example, Kanyinke 
(2010) claimed that exogenous institutions in East African communities in Kenya have not 
improved the well-being of local communities, but instead have sown seeds of conflict by 
dividing community members into traditional and western groups. Likewise, Yamia et al 
(2009) argued that their study of Sub-Saharan African communities revealed that indigenous 
institutions were sound and peaceful when compared with the exogenous institutions that 
replaced them. According to Taylor, capitalist organizations were the agents of structural 
violence, since they caused “uneven development which manifests in extreme inequality 
between social classes” (cited in Arisukwu and Nnaomah 2010, p.139). Clempson, 2012, p. 
2) claims that at the global level there was a general belief among development theorists that  
”international institutions, powerful states and transnational corporations” were important 
causes of structural violence in Africa (see also Shaw, 2012). Such external institutions were 
structured around neo-liberal principles and were causes of structural violence because these 
values were not consistent with the culture of their host communities (Mpofu, 2012, p.1; 
Benneth and Dearden, 2014). Iwara (2010) cautioned about the dangers of following 
exogenous prescriptions of development which undermined indigenous institutions, since 
these traditional institutions had been tested and tried over long periods of time (see also 
Lule, 1995). 
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Rodney (1973) argued that African communities could be equitable again if they break from 
the capitalist system (see also Tikly, 2004). Kendie and Guri (nd,) advocated the preservation 
and promotion of indigenous traditional institutions like clan, kingship, and nnoboa 
(community self-help) where they still existed in this post-colonial era, because they served 
their people well before the European colonisation of Africa, and they have been in the 
business of community governance and community development (CD) since pre-colonial 
times. Currently, the majority of people (who live in rural areas) were still organized around 
this indigenous type of non-violent organization (Kendie and Guri, nd, p.1 and Onyeozu, 
2010). 
 
However, in opposition to this sustained attack on exogenous forces for introducing structural 
violence to previously peaceful traditional African communities, other writers blamed 
traditional institutions (i.e. endogenous factors) for the structural violence that exists  in 
contemporary African communities. For example, Platteau and Abraham (2002, p. 114) 
traced structural violence in Africa mainly to the paternalistic culture on which African 
communities and their indigenous institutions were framed, since their leadership: 
  
“provides an authority structure which imposes its rule or its interpretation of 
the tradition on the lower people who have no choice but to comply. The latter 
do not dare speak out their possible disagreement and, out of fear of 
retribution, they may just pay lip service to decisions or rules which they do 
not like”. 
 
According to this interpretation, African institutions were seen as constituting a primitive and 
limiting structure which “divests African thinking of any inner impulse to liberate itself from 
irrationality, myths and obsolete habits” (Kebede, 1999, p.2). This school of thought claims 
that Africans maintained and nourished structural violence in their thoughts, persistently 
clinging on to their traditional institutions (Kebede, 1999). Calderisi, in his work, ‘The 
Trouble with Africa: Why Foreign Aid isn’t Working’, claimed that the major cause of 
structural violence in African communities lay in the very heart of African institutions and 
not to exogenous influence, pointing out that “Africa has been making its own history since 
independence and has been largely free of foreign domination since the end of the cold war” 
(Calderisi, 2006, p.3; see also Collier and Guning, 1999), yet it has been plagued by structural 
violence throughout its post-colonial history. Calderisi (2006) argues that indigenous African 
institutions were built on their own oppressive values and cultures.  
 
We should note that for yet other writers, both exogenous and endogenous factors are to 
blame for structural violence. For example, Emeh (2013) cites Nnadozie who argued that 
structural violence in Africa was due to the conjunction of endogenous and exogenous elites: 
the two sets of actors interacted and reinforced each other (see also Clempson, 2012; 
Ikejiaku, 2009). We should also note that proponents of the view that structural violence was 
due to endogenous factors argue that the way to remove it was by restructuring 
indigenous/traditional institutions (Platteau and Abraham, 2002; Okeke-Ogbuafor et al, 
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2016a) through policies of equality and processes of democratisation - the same prescriptions 
which are offered by proponents of the view that exogenous factors were to blame for 
structural violence.  
 
3. The conditions of Ogoni communities  
 
Ogoniland is a kingdom in the Rivers state, one of Nigeria’s nine Niger Delta (ND) states. It 
is made up of four local government areas – Khana, Gokana, Eleme and Tai -  which together 
cover an area of about 1,000 km, with a total population of 832,000 in 2006 (UNEP, 2011). 
Oil was discovered in commercial quantities in this area during the mid-1950s. UNEP (2011) 
recorded that Ogoni communities host 12 oilfields, 116 drilled wells, 89 completed wells and 
5 flow stations each with a capacity of 185,000 barrels per day. Pyagbara (2007) noted that 
these were all Shell facilities because Shell was the only multinational oil company with an 
Oil Mining Licence for the whole of Ogoniland. From the beginning of oil capitalism in the 
1950s to 1993, the year Shell moved out of Ogoni, Detheridge (cited in Boele et al, 2001)  
pointed out that the 634 million barrels of oil produced in this kingdom added about US$5.2 
billion in revenue to the Nigerian national budget. 
 
The Nigerian government has for over five decades intervened to bring peace and improve 
the life of the Ogonis, but these efforts have  yet to yield the desired results (Tobor, 2016; 
Onuoha, 2016; Odubo and Tobor, 2016; Odalonu, 2015; Oladele and Austen, 2015). Often 
these interventions trigger conflicts which disturb the limited peace that communities enjoy. 
For example, the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), created to restore peace 
and bring development, has been described as a source of conflict because   aggrieved 
community members especially militants groups, who felt their communities were 
disenfranchised from NDDC projects, doubled their attack on the Nigerian state and 
multinational oil companies, thereby causing more mayhem in their already fragile 
communities (Aghalino, nd; Rexler, 2010). 
The UNDP Niger Delta Human Development report (2006, p.2), described Ogoni 
communities as home to one of the world’s poorest populations:  it is “a place of frustrated 
expectations and deep-rooted mistrust. Unprecedented restiveness at times erupts in violence” 
(see also Paki and Ebienfa, 2011). Even though there are no current official statistics that 
record the rate and depth of poverty in Ogoniland (Oluwaseun, 2016), writers say things are 
not getting any better for the majority of Ogonis (Okeke-Ogbuafor et al, 2016b; Gonzalez and 
Derudder, 2016; Oluwaseun, 2016). In other words, the living condition of the Ogonis may 
now have fallen below the level described in 2009, where the majority live on less than US$1 
per day (Ikejiaku, 2009). Oluwaseun (2016, p. 174), reports that the  average Ogoni indigene 
is forced by circumstances to ‘feed from hand to mouth’ and send her  children to poorly 
managed government schools (see also Okeke-Ogbuafor et al, 2016b). According to 
commentators, Ogonis had lost control over their environment (Ikerionwu, 2013) and their 
lives (Akinbobola and Njori, 2014). Community chiefs and other members of a small elite 
dominate marginalized poor community members (Okeke-Ogbuafor et al, 2016a; Nwankwo, 
2015). 
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Ogonis fell mostly within the helpless and militant groups (Okeke-Ogbuafor et al, 2016b; 
Oluwaseun, 2016; Asuni, 2009; Kialee, 2011; Arisuokwu and Nnaomah, 2012). The helpless 
category was the worst hit when there were threats like “health, economic down turns and 
even man-made violence” (Rayhan and Philip, 2004, p.ii). The militant category, according 
to Oluwaniyi (2010), was made up of youths who had graduated from being members of their 
communities’ indigenous youth organizations to becoming dangerous firebrands. This set of 
community members was mostly made up of young, single and unemployed males who felt 
economically powerless following the destruction of their environment and the 
marginalization they faced at the hands of national and local community elites (Asuni, 2009). 
Such marginalization and disempowerment provoked “deep rooted frustration” which 
explained the spread of violence across their communities (Paki and Ebienfa, 2011, p.141). 
While some members of this group were criminally or politically motivated for selfish 
reasons, according to Asuni (2009, p.3), others were “ideologically driven”. Kialee (2011) 
noted that Ogoni communities were home to some of the deadliest grassroot cult groups in 
Nigeria. The activities of militants and cultists in Ogoniland account for the loss of lives and 
increases in the level of poverty and community underdevelopment (Kialee, 2011). For 
example, the Kpong community witnessed five months of conflict in 2007 (April-
September), while Zaakpon  suffered the same fate for four years (2003-2007)  with over 30  
deaths, destruction of property and the displacement of community members (Kialee, 2011). 
Gonzalez and Derudder (2016), notes that Ogoni and the entire Niger Delta remains a very 
volatile region.  
 
Many  scholars blamed  this  parlous  condition of Ogonis mostly on Shell, arguing that its  
capitalist intrusion led to inequitable policies imposed by the Nigerian government on  
Ogonis; the destruction of the Ogoni environment by Shell; and a culture of corruption 
among Ogoni elites (Okoh 2005; Nbete 2012; Okeke-Ogbuafor et al, 2017c). Pyagbara 
(2007) asserted that Shell’s oil business not only caused poverty but also disfigured 
Ogoniland’s once-communal indigenous institutions/ organizations, and as a result, these 
institutions/organizations, which were previously peaceful structures, themselves became 
sources of further structural violence (Nweke, 2014; Igbara and Keenam, 2013). However, 
other writers argued that indigenous institutions, and in fact their entire host communities, 
had always been sources of structural violence, and oil capitalism had only made it worse 
(Okeke-Ogbuafor et al, 2016a). Platteau and Abraham (2002) asserted that community 
imperfections did not begin with capitalist intrusion, though they may have been exacerbated 
by it. However, although they disagreed about its cause, all these writers agreed on the fact 
that there is structural violence in Ogoniland. Indeed as noted by Dilts et al (2012, p.1):   “if 
we…limit ourselves to an analytics of violence that points solely to agents and intentions, we 
are sure to miss the pervasive forms of violence that are built into structures, institutions, 
ideologies, and histories”. The current study seeks to investigate the perceptions of Ogonis 
about the existence and causes of structural violence in their communities. 
 
4. Methods of collection and analysis of primary data   
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This study relied mainly on qualitative methods of primary data collection, consisting of 
open-ended survey questionnaires (SQs); focus group discussions (FGDs; and key informant 
interviews (KIs),  in order to understand Ogoni’s perceptions about structural violence in 
their communities. Alexander Jakob, cited in Yeasmin (2012, p.1), makes a case for such 
combining of different methods of data collection: by “multiple observers, theories, methods, 
and empirical materials, researchers can hope to overcome the weakness or intrinsic biases 
and the problems that come from single method, single-observer, single-theory studies”. 
Fieldwork was carried out between February and May 2014 in five oil-rich and three oil- 
poor communities. During this fieldwork, 200 SQs were administered by the researcher and 
an assistant. SQ respondents, most of whom had received a basic education and were mainly 
community leaders/elites, were recruited through snow-ball sampling based on their 
knowledge of the topic of study. It is important to state that participants were generally not 
familiar with the academic phrase ‘structural violence’, but they had a clear understanding of 
experiencing it. This is reflected in the pattern of responses received from the 189 SQs 
returned. These SQs provided both qualitative and quantitative data; mostly about the 
underlying causes; manifestations; and their experiences of structural violence. 
Marginalization, force, Shell, the government (Nigeria), poverty, conflicts, and helplessness, 
were repeated themes that SQ respondents identified as causes of their problems. The 
frequency of these themes was worked out in percentages using Microsoft Excel. To 
elaborate these themes, the three focus group discussions (FGDs) that were conducted sought 
participants’ perception about them.  For representativeness (to reduce bias), participants in 
the FGDs were recruited from their indigenous community-based organizations (CBOs) 
based on their knowledge and willingness to participate in this study. In Africa, membership 
of indigenous CBOs is regarded as important and in some case mandatory (Okeke-Ogbuafor 
et al, 2016b; Green, 2010).  
 
Lastly, 69 key informants (KIs), identified/or recommended during the course of 
administering the SQs and conducting FGDs, were interviewed. About 60% of these KIs 
were poor members of their community indigenous CBOs/institutions, and the remaining 
40% were made up of Shell officials, community chiefs/ elites, community religious leaders, 
researchers from the University of Port Harcourt and non-Ogoni indigenes resident in 
Ogoniland. Like FGD participants, efforts were made to recruit KIs from their established 
indigenous CBOs (council of chiefs and elders; women; men and youth groups). Since these 
KIs were not familiar with the phrase ‘structural violence’, the interviewer’s questions were 
mostly about the manifestations and underlying causes of structural violence. Owing to the 
flexibility of the semi-structured method of data collection, KIs comfortably expressed their 
thoughts by sometimes moving away from the researcher’s questions to explain personal or 
general incidences that supported their claims. Some KIs took to narrating their own life 
experiences and telling stories that their fathers told them - i.e. using the past to explain 
present practices. As Creswell (1994) notes, this method of research leads to discovery 
because it not only explains events as they occur in their natural setting, but it also enables 
the researcher to interpret the significance of these events. To make further sense of these 
events, the researcher tested the data on manifestations and underlying causes of structural 
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violence as reported by participants against evidence of structural violence documented in the 
literature (Golquitt and Zapata-Phelan, 2007).  
 
Comments in the open-ended survey questionnaires (SQs), and transcribed texts of FGDs and 
KIs  were divided into themes, and into the contexts in which these themes were used. These 
data sets were analysed and the themes and their contexts were threaded together. Burnard et 
al (2008) describes the method of qualitative analysis used in this study as ‘thematic content 
analysis’.   
 
5. Results and discussion of the primary data  
 
Section 5 is divided into two parts – Ogonis’ perceptions of (1) the manifestations, and (2) 
the causes, of structural violence   
 
5.1 Manifestations of structural violence in Ogoni communities 
 
Findings from this study showed that community members experienced both visible and 
invisible forms of structural violence.  
 
5.1.1 Visible structural violence 
 
Almost all survey questionnaire respondents (SQs), focus group discussants (FGDs) and key 
informants (KIs) described the manifestation of visible structural violence. For them, 
common manifestations of structural violence were cashlessness, lack of basic infrastructure 
and escalation of physical conflict. For example, KI-3, a Councillor, said: 
 
“we don’t have cash, there is so much poverty here. Our people are not educated not 
because they are not willing but because their parents are equally poor and not 
educated. Poverty is a cycle, if my parents were farmers and did not send me to 
school because all we do is to plant cassava, yam and cocoyam and then harvest to 
eat and not for sell... my own children will end up becoming low scale cassava and 
cocoyam farmers… this is our problem” 
 
KI-20, a former councillor, described the manifestation of structural violence in their 
communities as mostly the lack of basic amenities “the problem is that we do not have 
infrastructures…this is what our people are fighting for”. FGD-1 said their communities had 
suffered instability: “the issue is that there are so many reasons why we experience inter and 
intra community conflict. Youth restiveness is a common reason. In short the genesis is 
poverty and unemployment”. KI-67 explained that in 2013, within his Gokana local 
government “seven of our communities were warring”.  
 
5.1.2 Invisible structural violence 
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Nearly all SQs, FGDs and KIs described manifestations of invisible structural violence. 
These manifestations can be divided into three categories: social inequality; political 
exclusion; and community development.   
 
Social inequality  
 
Thirty one KIs and eight SQs held that their community and traditional institutions were 
deeply unequal because the poor and uneducated members were marginalised. KI-54, 
reported that within his indigenous CBO, it “is big man talk to big man” and a “man who 
owns a big car will hardly become friends with someone that cannot afford a bicycle wheel… 
because the difference between them is wide” (SQ-63). SQ-2 explained she was always 
overlooked in her organization: “nobody sees you as a human being…the rich intimidate us”. 
In fact, within indigenous organizations, the poor and uneducated were not only voiceless but 
“feel socially excluded” (SQ-79). Moreover, 21 participants internalised the treatment meted 
out to them by better placed members of their organizations. For example, KI-39 explained 
that he was unsure about his mental state and said “am not reasonable”, while KI-34 said “I 
cannot talk when people are talking”. KI-45 said she might possess qualities that caused her 
rejection because “am not relevant to our people, and nobody even cares whether I come for 
meetings or not”.   
 
It is true that despite the indigent CBOs’ negative impacts on their well-being, many Ogonis 
had a strong attachment to their indigenous CBOs for their potential as ideal models for 
community enrichment. At the root of this aspirational attachment was the communitarian 
belief about community and citizenship as an ideal or ‘common good’, which was considered 
prior to individual self-interest. Indeed, an “individual’s sense of identity is produced only 
through relations with others in the community of which she or he is a part” (Gaventa, 2002, 
p.5; see also Kochalumchvvalti, 2010). Ogoni community chiefs/elites like KI-1 warned that 
for better or for worse, community members “must identify with their community” (Okeke-
Ogbuafor et al 2016, p. 6). For example, membership of indigenous institutions, especially 
CBOs, was very important in Ogoniland, and, according to Green (2010), relinquishing 
membership of this organization disqualified an individual from being an indigene of the 
community. KI-27 reports that as the “first form of identity in our community…If you decide 
to relinquish your membership that means you will be an outcast”. But other Ogonis found 
these invisible coils of collectivism oppressive and were willing to risk abandonment by their 
community by leaving them. For example SQ-101 stated clearly that it was over between him 
and his organization: “yes, I accept that I am an outcast, I belong to myself”. KI-64 also 
stated that he no longer identified with his FTCBO, “I don’t belong to any organization…you 
know I don’t have money and good clothes, they will not respect me.”  
 
 Political exclusion  
 
A study of the governing structures of African communities by Platteau and Abraham (2002, 
p.112) revealed that community leadership structures were often autocratic because of the 
traditional belief that the chief and his entourage “embodies the will of supernatural agencies 
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[the ancestors’ souls] which are believed to govern every aspect of people’s life”. Ogonis still 
practised the traditional system of inherited leadership which many of them saw as sacred 
since it was inherited from their ancestors (Okeke-Ogbuafor et al, 2016a). As a result, 
chieftaincy stools were respected and hardly contested because of the fear that “if he [chief] is 
changed something bad will happen in the community, fear will not even allow people to 
question them” (Okeke-Ogbuafor et al, 2016a, p. 60). According to 26 KIs, their chiefs 
appointed the leaders of their various CBOs, and, unsurprisingly, these appointed leaders 
together with their members did not “confront their traditional leaders”. KI-26, from an oil- 
rich community, confirmed that community youths  were not given the opportunity to choose 
their own leader: “he was appointed by the paramount ruler and they presented him before 
the youths”. Likewise KI- 65, from an oil–poor community, said their youth and women 
leaders were imposed on them: “our youth leader was not voted for, even our women 
leader…I went to the town square and heard my chief announcing to the women, the name of 
their new leader”. KI-2 reported that the poor women in his community “can explain why 
they don’t want a particular candidate to be their leader but our leaders [chief] will not see 
any sense in what these women are saying. They see such talks as unreasonable argument, 
after all what does she know?” 
 
Under this traditional system of leadership, therefore, community members were not engaged 
in the management of their community. KI-28 asserted that the system lacked accountability:  
“imagine you cannot question its authority except you are a politician” (see Chigudu, 2015). 
KI-67 pointed out that “our women are not normally involved in decision making, I mean 
women don’t have a voice… these women cannot come and defend their own interest”. It was 
likewise with the poor and uneducated. These respondents suffered invisible forms of 
structural violence because “our chiefs do not listen to their voices” (KI-16). Some of them 
feared to express their feelings: SQ-90 reported that they (the poor) kept to themselves 
because they did not want to get into trouble. KI-43 said “I am a widow, if I talk and get into 
trouble nobody will help me”. FG-1 noted that “if you do not have money, you have to learn 
to shut up your mouth”. In other words, this system of governance was not only exclusionary, 
it instilled fear in community members and as a result, restricted their freedom to make 
choices (Chigudu 2015 and Okeke-Ogbuafor et al 2016a; Platteau and Abraham, 2002;). 
 
KI-3 traced conflicts in his community to its malformed community governance structure: 
“honestly we do not have good forums, there has been chieftaincy tussles…and problems in 
almost all our communities”. KI-63 recounted the physical and human casualties his 
community experienced - “buildings were razed, lives were wasted” - because corrupt chiefs 
bought cult boys to protect their thrones (KI-67; see also Arisuokwu and Nnaomah, 2012; 
Kialee, 2011). Not every community member was able to absorb the pain that came with such 
discrimination and lack of inclusion, and FGD-1 reported that sometimes they conquered 
their fears and manifested visible forms of structural violence by engaging in conflict: “since 
we don’t have what it takes to meet them [community chiefs/elites], we sometimes get 
violent…with the hope that things will get better. Our leaders misrepresent us, they don’t 
always tell the truth, they lie, they tell people we are happy and enjoying” (see Asuni, 2009; 
Arisuokwu and Nnaomah, 2012; Mohammed, 2013; Zandvliet and Pedro, 2002). KI-19 
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confirmed that “frustration is the ultimate cause of violence”. Mohammed (2013, p. 239) 
asserted that “indigenous leaders have helped incredibly in sustaining the sufferings of their 
communities”. 
 
Economic corruption  
 
Traditionally, community leaders were charged with the responsibility of community 
development (Pyagbara, 2007; Onyeozu, 2010; Arisuokwu and Nnaomah, 2012). However, 
in Ogoniland, community chiefs and leaders of their indigenous organizations were accused 
of re-defining community development to mean self-enrichment because they partnered with 
Shell at the expense of their subjects (Pyagbara, 2007). According to Zandvliet and Pedro 
(2002) and Nweke (2012), this happened because Shell wooed these chiefs with cash. Shell 
has consistently denied that it bribed traditional chiefs/elites, insisting that it gave out cash to 
community leaders for community development. For example, KI-23, a social performance 
officer with Shell, claimed that the funds they sent into local communities were not bribes, 
because “we work along Ogoni community structure. We have to hand over the money to 
their chiefs and leaders of their organizations. Imagine yearly we ask them to provide a 
business plan so that we can work hand in hand with them as part of our development plan. 
But you still see that these projects are hijacked by their community elites”. KI-23 claimed 
that the structure of their communities allowed only members of the chiefs’ families and their 
elites to benefit from monies sent into their communities. For instance, poor residents did not 
have access to the scholarship programmes arranged by Shell: “we only hear that Shell 
awards scholarship to our people. My children have not benefitted anything” (KI-55). These 
respondents said they suffered emotional pain as a result of their cashlessness, because their 
chiefs escaped these deprivations and did not devise ways to help the community. SQ-3 said 
that they “feast on the community”. KI-43 said “our leaders take all our good things”, 
nothing trickles down to the poor (KI-21). KI-32 said: “see what all of us look like in this 
community, do I look like a human being?” KI-51 said that “I feel people are laughing at me 
because of my condition [poverty]. My financial condition is taking life from me, it is the 
cause of all my problems, if I had money the community will respect me”. KI-57 said that 
“our leaders collect money from Shell and nothing gets to us”. Chiefs actually impeded 
developers “because they always demand for money from them, now…see all the 
uncompleted projects around us” (SQ-7).   
 
5.2 Causes of structural violence in local communities 
 
Respondents who were members of the elites were more likely than poorer respondents to 
identify exogenous causes for the structural violence in their communities. For example, 
many SQ respondents blamed Shell for causing discord: “Shell takes delight in divide and 
rule game…that is the main problem” (SQ-1). Eleven KIs also referred to Shell’s divide-and-
rule tactics in their communities. For example, KI-26 reported that:  
 
‘Shell always use divide and rule tactics for us…most of their projects don’t favour 
the whole community and when our youths rise to say ‘No’ to this, they [Shell] call 
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some youth leaders and elders including our chief. Shell gives them some money and 
then mobilise them against other youths, they also use money to settle our chiefs and 
elders, this brings in problems in the community and it is the main cause of our 
problems” 
 
Sixteen KIs (mostly community chiefs and leaders of indigenous CBOs) traced the major 
causes of structural violence in their communities directly to Shell. Other respondents blamed 
both Shell and the Nigerian government. For example, SQs made little distinction between 
the two exogenous sources: SQ-1 asserted that “Shell and our president [Nigeria] are one 
body”). Eleven 11 KIs saw the Nigerian government as the primary cause, using Shell to 
control local communities. For example, KI-32 said that “they [government] link us to our 
enemy [Shell]…they use our leaders [chiefs] to achieve their evil intentions”. This conspiracy 
of corruption explained why “the state does not monitor our leaders [chief]…nobody 
questions them” (KI-22). The 189 survey questionnaires revealed that there was no 
significant difference in respondents’ perceptions about the causes of structural violence 
between oil-rich and oil-poor communities, since 90% of the participants in all communities 
traced the root cause of structural violence in their communities to Shell and the Nigerian 
government (See Table 1).   
 
Table: 1 shows the perceptions of SQs participants across communities on the causes of 
structural violence 
 
Community Endogenous 
causes (%) 
Exogenous 
causes (%) 
Total number of 
participants 
oil rich 2.65 13.76 31 
oil poor 2.12 11.11 25 
oil poor 1.06 12.17 25 
oil poor 1.06 13.23 27 
oil rich 0.00 11.11 21 
oil rich 0.00 7.94 15 
oil rich 0.00 12.17 23 
oil rich 0.53 11.11 22 
 
Poorer respondents were more likely than elites to perceive the root source of structural 
violence in their communities to lie in endogenous causes. For example, 33 poor KIs traced 
the cause of structural violence directly to the customs and indigenous institutions controlled 
by their community chiefs. For some of these poor KIs, their customs and indigenous 
institutions exacerbated Shell’s dismal performance in their communities. For others, the 
indigenous causes were primary and the exogenous causes were secondary. For example, KI-
63 claimed that “all our problems are caused by our leaders because cheating from the top 
[Shell] is not possible without them” [chiefs].  
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Other respondents traced the source of structural violence in their communities to both 
endogenous and exogenous causes. For example, K1-25 attributed structural violence in his 
community to both the sacredness traditionally accorded to chieftaincy stools and Shell’s 
actions:  
  
“The problem we have here is from inside and outside. We do not have a functioning 
health centre in my community because of our chief and youth leader.  It is so because 
of the mere fact that the contractor handling the project has not gotten money to pay 
our youth president and our chief the money he owed them for the supply of sand and 
cement. You cannot imagine the little amount that they [chief and youth leader] are 
owed and the number of deaths that this has caused. I had no choice than to write a 
petition against our chief.  The commissioner of police invited him and after 
interrogation, the police asked us to settle it ourselves since it is more like a family or 
kingship matter. Today we do not have a health centre in my community, my people 
travel very far to get treatments. Shell itself is just a selfish organization, whatever 
they do is for their own self-interest…they take from us and have given nothing in 
return other than pains…see our environment is destroyed” 
 
On ways of dealing with exogenous causes of structural violence, respondents mostly held 
that the likely solution to their problems lay either in a complete disconnect of their 
communities from Shell or a change of operational strategy by Shell. About 20% of SQs 
wanted Shell to desist from sowing seeds of discord in their communities. Many participants 
(33 KIs and 14 SQs) agreed that economic and infrastructural development from Shell could 
help reduce the visible forms of structural violence which they experienced in their 
communities. SQ-149 said their communities and livelihoods would be equitable again if 
Shell were to improve their sources of livelihood and provide infrastructure in their 
communities, but it would not do this: “our crisis is because of the lack of electricity, water 
and good roads…Shell can afford to do them for us. But because they are troublemakers, 
they will not want us to enjoy”. 
 
On ways of dealing with endogenous causes of structural violence, 27 KI, 11 SQ and 3 FGD 
respondents suggested a review of the Ogoni culture in which indigenous institutions served 
as a source of collective identity and indigenous undemocratic leaders governed 
autocratically, siphoning off funds meant for community development - all of which served to 
legalize violence against the population (Galtung, 1990). Most of these respondents endorsed 
the notion of the decentralization of community power: “these people have so much power; 
we need to work against that” (KI-16). According to KI-65, this meant embracing democracy 
where members were free to vote for leaders of their choice. Through these processes 
(decentralization and democracy), the community governance structure would be sanitized 
since it would “remove all our leaders because they are not helping us, there are good people 
that can represent us very well” (KI-53). Okeke-Ogbuafor et al (2016a) noted that this 
proposal was not as utopian as it might seem, since there had already been some tentative 
steps in this direction in some Ogoni communities. For example, the so-called ‘rotating’, 
parallel’, and ‘complementary’ systems’ of governance’ were modest attempts by community 
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elites to dilute the traditional inherited system of leadership. The ‘rotating’ system was the 
first attempt made in some oil-rich communities to replace incumbent chiefs; the ‘parallel’ 
system involved the existence of a long-lasting opposition to the incumbent local chief; and 
the ‘complementary’ system was a more collective and cordial relationship between 
community elites and local chiefs.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
From the above account of the perceptions of Ogonis in oil-rich and oil-poor communities 
about the causes of structural violence in their communities, six conclusions have emerged.  
Structural violence does occur in Ogoni communities; it takes both visible and invisible 
forms; most community chiefs and elites blame exogenous factors for it, whereas most poor 
people blame endogenous factors; structural violence cannot be blamed on a single source  
because in practice exogenous and endogenous causes often works alongside and reinforce 
each other;  there is no significant difference between the nature of structural violence 
experienced by dwellers in oil-poor communities and those in oil-rich communities; and ways 
must be found to eliminate structural violence by reducing social, political and economic 
inequality, which lies at its heart.  
   
Because  this is the first study that looks at the perceptions of the Ogonis about the causes of 
structural violence in their oil-rich and oil-poor communities, this article recommends more 
research into this subject. Part of such research could involve attempts at quantifying 
structural violence in Ogoni communities or other parts of Nigeria and also looking at the 
implications for development.  
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